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Nikulin: Nikulin on Hirschkop

Ken Hirschkop, Mikhail Bakhtin: An Aesthetic for Democracy. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1999. xx + 332 pp. ISBN 0198159606 (paperback).
Reviewed by Dmitri Nikulin, New School for Social Research
The figure and works of Mikhail Mikhailovich Bakhtin have drawn much attention
from philosophers and literary critics in recent decades, giving rise to a number of
interesting appropriations of Bakhtinian texts and notions. One cannot help but feel,
however, that each time Bakhtin is approached for a coherent and more or less
systematic interpretation, he turns out to be a Proteus, constantly reemerging in new
disguises, changing the themes and the terms of discussion. Like Socrates’ dream
swan, he appears to be an author whom one can hardly catch in a final and definitive
way, who hides himself behind the ‘deuterocanonical’ texts published, not even under
a pseudonym, but under the real names of other people (V. Voloshinov, P. Medvedev,
I. Kanaev); the substantial contribution he makes cannot be satisfactorily determined.
Perhaps, in accord with his very ‘project’ of dialogism, Bakhtin escapes being
pinpointed in a definitive and final way (rendering the very idea of a systematic
project of dialogism rather doubtful); more than a coherent system of philosophical or
literary theory, he presents a number of unsystematic and unelaborated insights,
scattered throughout his texts.
Ken Hirschkop is fully aware of this difficulty, stating that “Bakhtin was to be a
creator of notebooks rather than books” (xvi, cp. 53). Bakhtin is, however, the creator
of two major books: the ‘dialogical’ one on Dostoevsky’s art (poetics) and the
‘carnivalesque’ one on Rabelais; also of several major texts, such as “Author and
Hero” and “Discourse in the Novel”; and, in addition, of a number of notebooks, some
of them published only recently. A remarkable feature of the ‘written’ Bakhtin is that
he appears to be so different from one text to another, always other, keeping an
unrevealed identity—which makes a consistent presentation of his thought a very
difficult task (perhaps comparable to the challenge of reconstructing Wittgenstein’s
thought).
Nevertheless, every attempt at a serious, thoughtful and careful reconstruction—of
which the present book is an example—can bring new light to the discussion and must
always be welcomed. Due to a certain non-systematicity and to the above-mentioned
richness and difference in Bakhtin’s topics, one can always run the risk of presenting
yet another title in an obviously endless series, “Bakhtin and ___”, where the blank
can be filled in by any notion importantw to a writer. In presenting an ambitious
account of Bakhtin, referring to a great variety of his texts, Hirschkop is obviously
aware of the danger of simplification involved in simply making another substitution
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for the blank. His main intention in the present book is to read out of (and at times
into) Bakhtin the possibility of a language of and for democracy.
The first part of the book (chapters 1 and 2) reconstructs dialogism in its relation to a
language of democracy, mostly in reference to “Discourse in the Novel” and “Author
and Hero in Aesthetic Activity.” The second part (chapter 3) considers Bakhtin’s
thought in its historical development, and the third part (chapters 4-7) discusses a
number of Bakhtin’s ideas (his understanding of language; theory of the novel; the
discussion of heteroglossia and of carnival) as they apply to the language Hirschkop is
searching for. Democracy, whose normative model is not spelled out in much detail
anywhere in the book [“One has to agree to the distribution of roles; one has the
opportunity to comment on them, judge them, suggest others: this means democracy”
(295)], has to be understood, after Habermas, not only procedurally, but also as
establishing itself as a democratic ethos based on certain intersubjectively verifiable
principles (28 sqq.). Democracy is undoubtedly a concept to be supported and
developed; in doing so, however, the author for the most part substitutes a number of
quotations and, at times, rhetorical ornamentation, for the elaboration of a systematic
account.
One of the central presuppositions of the author is that “there can and should be an
intimate relation between language and democracy” (x). Focusing his discussion
mostly on the linguistic range of possibilities, he argues that an agent in a democratic
society acts not only within a set or system of formal procedures, but also within a
particular culture (which is present through language par excellence), this being a
prerequisite for democracy.
Bakhtin himself was not much interested in political philosophy: “Bakhtin was
virtually worthless as a political thinker in the strict sense, but his disdain for the
ordinary business of politics, the distribution and mechanisms of political power, has a
certain virtue, for it led him to think of democracy not as a political category, but as a
cultural-aesthetic one, as the promise not so much of a society in which the people are
sovereign as of a society with a historical experience worth having” (274, cp. 290). As
Hirschkop argues, Bakhtin’s situation was unique: he was living simultaneously in an
environment without democratic procedures and in an established democratic culture
(that of the intelligentsia) (ix, 33). Thus, linguistic (cultural) democracy and
procedural (formal and legal) democracy are two separate aspects and can exist apart
from each other. As the author suggests, however, in order to be authentic (i.e., as a
democratic being), one has to participate in both aspects of democracy at the same
time. Thus, one needs to establish a proper language of and for democracy. In
Hirschkop’s account, it is through Bakhtin’s writings that it may become possible to
render such a language explicit (cp. 26 sqq. et passim). Since the democratic ethos has
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to presuppose democratic public discourse, the author’s intention becomes to read the
language of the democratic discourse out of Bakhtin (45-49 et al.). According to such
a reading, democracy, apart and even beyond its purely procedural aspect, should be
sought as a form of language in the first place. The peculiarity of Hirschkop’s
approach is that he finds it appropriate to refer mostly to Bakhtin’s aesthetics, while
dismissing his ethics, in trying to establish the desired ethos.
However laudable the intention to spell out a (if not the) language for democracy in its
aesthetic form might be, taken as a normative principle of reconstruction it leads one
to ignore the multi-faceted and at times seemingly incommensurable character of
Bakhtin’s texts, by reading and presenting them in a rather one-sided way, from a
preconceived angle, in an attempt to find a unified, intersubjectively valid aesthetic.
The author further stresses the importance of language in establishing a specific kind
of narrative, that of history: “History is the framing context which brings a language
out of itself and dialogizes it, introducing that element of self-distance necessary for
critical judgement; history, because the point of responsible action is not only the
satisfaction of needs and the enactment of justice, but the creation of a meaningful
narrative” (295). Hirschkop attempts to read out of Bakhtin “a conception of history
which is entirely aesthetic” (287), reproaching Bakhtin for never having left “the
dream of purely ethical dialogue” (221).
If history is to be portrayed as a narrative, then, of course, the role of language cannot
be underappreciated: “Only by translating these descriptions of language [Bakhtin’s
description of dialogicality] into a critique of a conception of language can we make
plausible the otherwise bizarre claim that the style and technique of a language could
be substantively relevant to a discussion of democracy” (16). The author pays
attention to the “linguistic turn” in Bakhtin, which goes hand in hand with Bakhtin’s
interest in the linguistics of Saussure, with the critique (together with Medvedov) of
the formal method in literary criticism, with a number of attempts to spell out the
fundamentals of the social (in Marxism and the Philosophy of Language) and
(primarily) of literature and human dialogical interaction, both mediated to a great
extent by the structures of language. It is thus from the point of view of the ‘linguistic
turn’ that Hirschkop tries to put the pieces of the Bakhtinian puzzle together into a
coherent picture. Consequently, dialogism in Bakhtin necessarily turns out to be
nothing more than an intersubjective relation, “a form of language,” in which the
relationship of the I to the other has to be thought primarily and exceptionally as
linguistic (155, 168 et passim; cp. language as dialogue, 207).
One wonders, however, if such a linguistically intersubjective unification of the
variety of remarkably multiple and truly pluralistic voices and appearances in Bakhtin
really does justice to his thought. No doubt, reflections on the role of language play an
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important part in different periods of Bakhtin’s life. It is not only Saussure (cp.
chapter 4, esp. p. 213 sqq.), however, but also—and primarily—Kant (and Hegel), as
well as the Neo-Kantians with their entire range of themes (the preeminence of the
functional, relational approach; the distinction between the sciences and humanities;
the attention paid to historical background in a systematic argument, etc.), who are of
major importance for understanding Bakhtin. Unfortunately, no concise account of
neo-Kantianism is found in the book, except for sporadic references (for instance, the
whole of Kant’s moral philosophy is given through a very brief reference to Scheler’s
criticism, 198-199). In Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics (Art) the human person
('lichnost’) is not portrayed as solely a form of language, is not reducible to a mere
referential source of a form (possibly, a number of heteroglotic forms) of speaking.
Dialogue itself is, of course, impossible without recurring to a language, particularly
to a language in its intersubjective function (its “double-voiced word”), which both
unites and separates the I and the other (and, to an extent, the I-for-myself and the Ifor-the-other). Dialogue is not, however, just a particular, historically developed form
of language. Although Bakhtin unequivocally recognizes the dialogicality of language
(at least, its inevitably dialogical overtones; cp. Sobranie sochineniy [Collected
Works], T. 5, Moscow, 1996, p. 238 et al.), he nevertheless stresses that the dialogical
interaction is primarily defined not by language (i.e., that dialogue is not solely a
linguistic phenomenon), but by a particular structure of the person (her
unfinalizability, represented through the voice), independently of both purely
ideological and linguistic discourse (cp. “Toward a Reworking of the Dostoevsky
Book” and Sobranie sochineniy, 63 sqq.).
Close and careful reading of Bakhtin makes it clear that the person, for him, is not (at
least, not only and not primarily) “an ideal framed by the traumas and transformations
of modern Europe,” as the author puts it (203); that it is not the case that “the subject
of dialogism finds itself in dialogue not with other persons but with other languages”
(222), but exactly the opposite. The person (or personality) for Bakhtin is a fully
independent and “unmerged consciousness” (Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics, 17 et
al.), interacting with other, equally independent persons, represented through
independent, individual voices. Although Hirschkop’s reconstruction may be a
consistent one, it does violence to the interpreted texts, and consequently has to
overlook, if not ignore, a number of Bakhtin’s key notions, which are mentioned in a
rather cursory way (e.g., that of the “event”, p. 210-211, 221-222; the “voice,” which
is identified with a “socio-ideological language,” p. 262, cp. p. 228), since they
obviously do not fit the author’s rigid interpretative scheme.
Furthermore, Hirschkop primarily tends to stress the “printed word” (e.g., p. 261),
whereas Bakhtin in his dialogism emphasizes the spoken word; being rather
suspicious of the very form of ‘Schriftlichkeit,’ he leaves the most intimate thoughts to
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the oral dialogical discussion (in the tea sessions till morning), to dialogue outside of
theoretically construed dialogism. Hirschkop also stresses the necessity of achieving
agreement and consensus through the dialogue (9, 227 et al.), whereas Bakhtin points
out that the dialogue is much more of an (inescapable) disagreement and dissensus,
the tragic rupture of calm unification, which is the conditio humana in the dialogical
exchange.
As might be expected, when Hirschkop abandons his attempt to fit Bakhtin into the
“___”, he is capable of providing an excellent scholarly work. Thus, the account in the
second part of the book (chapter 3, “Bakhtin Myths and Bakhtin History,” 111 sqq.)
of Bakhtin’s writings at all stages of his career is thoughtful and quite useful (except,
perhaps, for the last period, 1961-1975, which is presented rather sketchily; 190-193).
Among other interesting points aptly presented in the book, one might also mention
the discussion of the ambiguity of Bakhtin’s philosophical account of language
[which “has not only to represent contexts, but to respond to them” (213)], as well as
that of the mutual exclusivity and complementarity of dialogue and narrative (chapter.
5, 225 sqq.). Thus, despite a number of shortcomings in its philosophical
reconstruction—which forces Bakhtin into being solely a linguistic-intersubjective
thinker—the critical and historical parts of the book contain several valuable insights
and contributions to the understanding of Bakhtin’s development throughout different
periods of his life, a life that itself presents an important testimony to the epoch.
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